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Abstract
Reusing passwords across multiple websites is a common
practice that compromises security. Recently, Blum and Vem-
pala have proposed password strategies to help people calcu-
late, in their heads, passwords for different sites without de-
pendence on third-party tools or external devices. Thus far,
the security and efficiency of these “mental algorithms” has
been analyzed only theoretically. But are such methods us-
able? We present the first usability study of humanly com-
putable password strategies, involving a learning phase (to
learn a password strategy), then a rehearsal phase (to lo-
gin to a few websites), and multiple follow-up tests. In our
user study, with training, participants were able to calculate
a deterministic eight-character password for an arbitrary new
website in under 20 seconds.
1 Introduction
For over fifty years, passwords have served as the most
common method of human-computer authentication and are
likely to do so for the foreseeable future (Bonneau et al.
2015). Extensive research shows that many passwords in
use can be easily guessed (Mazurek et al. 2013) and that
people reuse passwords across different accounts (Bonneau
2012). Password reuse, though rampant in practice (Das et
al. 2014), leaves accounts vulnerable to a single breach, e.g.,
a malware attack to an unsecured website can lead to at-
tacks to more important accounts if they enable an attacker
to guess usernames and passwords. In order to generate se-
cure passwords, users have to create and remember complex
strings, which often results in forgetting their passwords af-
ter a certain period (Weiss and De Luca 2008). What makes
this process even more tedious is that users are often forced
to change their passwords. Unfortunately, the number of
unique and secure passwords that users can comfortably
memorize is very limited (Florencio and Herley 2007). To
overcome this limitation, most users tend to choose simpler
passwords, or one strong password and use it across multiple
websites. These approaches have resulted in many password
breaches over the past few years (BBC 2017; Forbes 2014;
Adobe 2013; LinkedIn 2012; Zappos 2012).
In an attempt to ameliorate these difficulties, re-
cent work has introduced mental password management
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schemas (Blocki et al. 2015; Blocki, Blum, and Datta 2013;
Blum and Vempala 2015; Blocki et al. 2014) that enable
users to systematically and securely generate and remember
passwords for their different accounts. These schemas model
passwords as mathematical functions from challenges (e.g.,
website names) to responses (character string passwords),
and design such functions that can be computed by humans.
Some of these schemas require paper or digital assistance
(Blocki et al. 2014), but we focus on those schemas that can
be computed in one’s mind without any additional resources.
For brevity, we use the term mindhash to refer to any such
password management schema that enables a user to men-
tally compute a different password for each challenge with-
out external memory or computational aid, i.e., without pa-
per or a smartphone (Blum and Vempala 2015). Mindhashes
require learning, memorization of a secret key, and execu-
tion when logging in to an account. In return for this effort,
users enjoy security in the form of provable resilience to a
small number of breaches. Blum and Vempala introduced
several simple mindhashes with varying complexity, mem-
ory, and execution requirements, accompanied by varying
security guarantees. We evaluate two of these mindhashes,
one of which requires memorizing only three words. The
schemas are resilient to multiple breaches in the sense that
even knowing multiple different challenge-password pairs,
an adversary is unlikely to be able to guess one’s password
to a different challenge. Moreover, these schemas are self-
rehearsing (Blocki, Blum, and Datta 2013) in the sense that
the process of typing passwords on different websites natu-
rally reinforces the user’s memory of the secret key.
Mindhashes may appear to be an appealing solution to
the problem of remembering different passwords. Whether
such methods are truly usable for most humans is an intrigu-
ing open question. Would human users (beyond mathemati-
cians) find these methods pleasant? Would they be willing
to adopt them? We address these questions through train-
ing and usability studies which are designed to teach mind-
hashes and measure their effectiveness. The amount of hu-
man computation required in executing these schemas was
analyzed in precise models of human mental effort (Blum
and Vempala 2015), but these formal models have yet to be
tested in human experiments.
Several factors are important in the usability of such a sys-
tem, including the amount of time that is required for learn-
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ing and practice; memorizing the secret key; and using the
mindhash to generate a password. It was suggested by Blum
and Vempala that a password strategy is humanly usable
if “any initial long-term memorization should take at most
1 hour, preferably less than 20 minutes; future rehearsals
should take at most a total of 1 hour over the user’s lifetime.
Generation of a 10-character password should take at most
30 seconds, preferably less than 20 seconds.” In this work,
we compare the usability of two mindhashes: a random-
letter hash (a simplification of other schemas from Blum and
Vempala) and a 3-word hash (called LP2 in Blum and Vem-
pala). Following Blum and Vempala, we also define security
of a password strategy by: (i) given no prior information,
how difficult it would be for an adversary to guess any gen-
erated password, and (ii) given that an Internet hacker has
access to a few passwords that are generated using a specific
password strategy, how difficult it would be to guess a new
password generated with the same password strategy.
In our empirical user study, we teach participants how to
use a mindhash using videos (less than 5 minutes) that ex-
plain the concept and the problem being solved and teaches
them how to compute the mindhash function in general. We
then help them to choose their secret key and to memo-
rize it and have them practice using the mindhash on arti-
ficial website names. We later performed follow-up experi-
ments simulating logins over the next month to evaluate how
quickly and accurately participants can use their mindhashes
on these and further artificial website names.
We find that for the random-letter hash (3-word hash), the
teaching phase involved 5.2 (4) minutes of videos, a me-
dian of 8 (4.7) minutes to choose and memorize a secret
key, a median of 6 (7.8) minutes to practice the mindhash
on 15 logins. On these and 24 other logins performed over
the next month, the median time to enter a password was
2.9 (3.2) seconds per character, and the mean success rate of
typing the correct password within the first three tries was
98% (91%). Hence, there seems to be a tradeoff between
learning and execution, with the 3-word hash being faster
to learn and memorize a secret key, while the random-letter
hash was faster to execute and gives higher accuracy.
The target audience of mindhashes is, potentially, anyone
who seeks a secure way to remember different passwords
across many different accounts. The participants in our us-
ability study were US-based crowd workers on Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk crowdsourcing platform, which has been
shown to source a diverse set of users (Stewart et al. 2015;
Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling 2011) and often produce
results similar to those of more traditional approaches (Bent-
ley, Daskalova, and White 2017). Nonetheless, such users
have a certain minimum age and demonstrated the ability
to learn to perform tasks (we filtered for 98% task approval
rating), which may differ from other groups of people us-
ing multiple accounts. More specifically, our participants re-
ported being between 21 and 55 years old, with the gender
distribution of 40% female and 60% male.
One experimental challenge is identifying whether (and
how often) participants consult written or digital records of
their secret keys. It is known that some people record pass-
words, and self-reporting cannot be relied upon, especially
among Mechanical Turk workers (Peer et al. 2017) who have
concerns about bonuses and future work. To reduce the uti-
lization of written records, we provided participants with a
button that would, with a single press, remind them of their
secret key while logging in. While this limits the ecological
validity of our study, it enables us to track the frequency with
which participants consulted this reminder. Participants var-
ied in the frequency with which they pressed the secret key
reminder button, though the frequency generally decreased
(except among those participants that never pressed the but-
ton). The question of if users would keep records (and for
what duration) is left for future work.
Mindhashes may be a viable alternative to the common
password management approaches of password reuse or
writing passwords down. Another solution to the password
memorization problem is to use a third-party password man-
agement software. Password vaults have become popular
over the past few years as they require the user to remem-
ber only one master password and then the system automat-
ically fills in login pages with strong (randomly generated)
passwords. Unfortunately, this results in a single point of
failure, which has caused security breaches (Gasti and Ras-
mussen 2012). Popular password vaults have been vulnera-
ble to security attacks in recent years (LastPass 2015; OneL-
Ogin 2017). Moreover, the user must install the vault on ev-
ery device that she uses, making it difficult to use on shared
devices such as a library computer or a friend’s phone.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we define the random-letter and 3-word hashes. In Section 3,
we describe the usability study in detail including the precise
instructions given to the participants Then we present the
results of the user study in Section 4. In Section 5, we recall
the human computation model of Blum and Vempala and
use it to analyze the usability and security of the random-
letter and 3-word hashes. We discuss limitations of our study
and mental password management schemas in Section 6 and
present conclusions and future work in Section 7.
2 Mindhashes
Here we describe two mindhash functions and approaches
to choose and memorize their secret keys. We will use these
mindhashes in our empirical and theoretical analysis. Both
mindhashes consist of a map from letters to letters. To gen-
erate a password, this character map is applied to the chal-
lenge (website name) left-to-right, and a special character
string is appended that meets various password-composition
policies. For example, if the website name is six characters
and the special string is three characters, then the password
will be nine characters, consisting of the application of the
character map to each of the six characters of the website
name followed by the three-character special string. Blum
and Vempala give more sophisticated mindhashes that have
stronger security guarantees, but for the purposes of this
study we restrict our attention to this character map type
that still offers significantly higher security than reusing a
small number of passwords. Note that for actual use, small
modifications are necessary for special cases such as non-
alphabetical characters or very short domain names, as dis-
cussed in Section 6.
3-word hash. For this mindhash, the secret key consists of
a user-selected 3 words that in total contain at least 15 dif-
ferent letters of the alphabet, a random letter (which we will
refer to as a wild card), and a special character string consist-
ing of an uppercase letter, a digit, and a non-alphanumeric
character. The three words are concatenated to one single
string, called the 3-word string. For example, one secret key
is shown in Table 2. In this example, the 3-word string con-
3-word string wild card special string
adjust flight computer x B7!
tains the 17 distinct letters a c d e f g h i j l m o p r s t u.
The character map takes any letter l of the alphabet to the
consonant that appears after the first occurrence of l in the
3-word string. In case that the letter l is not present in the
3-word string, then it maps it to the wild card. If the letter is
the last consonant of the 3-word string, then it wraps around
to the first consonant. Consonants are chosen because they
offer greater entropy and hence greater security than vowels,
which are more common and hence easier to guess.
Figure 1 shows an example of how to apply the 3-word
mindhash. Suppose that you want to login to amazon.com.
The challenge is the word amazon.
• Start with a (first letter of amazon) and find the first occur-
rence of a in adjust flight computer. Output the consonant
that appears after a, which is d (Figure 1, box 1).
• The next letter is m and it appears in computer. The con-
sonant after it is p. Output p (Figure 1, box 2).
• Repeat on the remaining letters of amazon (Figure 1,
boxes 3-4).
• Append the special string B7! (Figure 1, box 5).
Here are some examples of websites and their passwords.
challenge 3-word Random-letter
amazon dpdxmxB7! qjqdr8*A
facebook ldmrxmmxB7! bqhgfddn8*A
fidelity lgjrggfxB7! blcgply8*A
Table 1: Passwords generated using our mindhashes.
Random-letter hash. Like the 3-word hash, the random-
letter hash is defined by a letter-to-consonant map and a spe-
cial character string. Concretely, the user is aided in picking
a random letter-to-consonant map for the first 20 letters of
the alphabet (this truncation was done to increase usability
– considering the fact that frequency of the letters uvwxyz is
about 8% in total) and choosing a special 3-character string
that meets common password-composition policy require-
ments. If the challenge contains a letter from uvwxyz, the
user skips that letter without any output. Alternatively, one
could map each of these letters to a wild card, but since these
letters are not common, this is not necessary and is not con-
sidered here. For example, consider the map
and the special string 8*A. Suppose that you want to login
to amazon.com. The challenge is the string amazon.
Figure 1: An example of generating a password using the
3-word mindhash. The top table shows the secret key and
boxes 1-5 show the password generation step by step.
a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t
q f h c g b s k l m n p j r d t n w x y
• Start with the first letter of the challenge a and find its
mapping in the above table, q. Output q.
• The next letter is m, output j.
• Repeat on the remaining letters of amazon.
• Append the special string 8*A.
See Table 1 for a few examples.
Memorizing the 3-word hash. The user memorizes the
string of three words (order of words matters), a wild card
and a special string.
Memorizing the random-letter hash. The user memo-
rizes the letter hash using our method Memorization with
help of words. The idea of this method is the following. The
user looks at each letter pair, e.g., (a, q), and types the first
word that comes to her mind that starts with the first letter
and has the target letter as the next consonant, e.g., aqua. She
will do the same for all letter pairs (Table 2 left).
Note that the mnemonics do not, in fact, have to be En-
glish words, but can be any memorable strings. Once the
words are written for all pairs, the user only needs to memo-
rize the (first letter, word) associations (Table 2 right). This
a q aqua
b f beef
c h chef
d c duck
e g . . .
a aqua
b beef
c chef
d duck
e . . .
Table 2: Memorization with help of words.
part should be rehearsed with repetition, i.e., rote memoriza-
tion. Once the (letter, word) associations are memorized, the
user can directly use them to recover the letter hash. Finally,
the user memorizes the special string.
3 Human Usability Study Design
In this section, we describe the details of our usability study.
Participants were randomly divided into two groups, with
half of the participants being assigned to each mindhash.
The reader can access and try all our surveys at the following
link: https://github.com/PasswordUsability/Surveys
Qualification. The participants had to pass a qualification
test to be able to participate in our study. The qualification
included reading a paragraph, informing about password se-
curity and then describing the study, followed by a few sim-
ple multiple choice questions. The qualification tested that
participants were paying attention and understood the need
for having different passwords for different websites.
Learning the 3-word hash. We showed the participants a
short video teaching them how to generate a password with a
3-word mindhash. After the video, to make sure they under-
stood the idea, we asked them to generate passwords for one
website using the same secret key that was used in the video
tutorial. Participants were provided with the secret key, mul-
tiple attempts, and hints to aid in learning. At the end of
this phase, participants learned how to generate passwords
using a 3-word mindhash. After this phase, we asked the
participants to choose their own three words sequence, wild
card letter, and special string. Participants were allowed to
proceed only if their word sequence contained at least 15
different letters and their special string contained an upper-
case letter, a number, and a special character. As participants
typed their 3 words, an alphabet letter bar, with the used let-
ters crossed out, and the number of used letters was shown.
This was to simplify the process of choosing words.
Learning the random-letter hash. We showed the partic-
ipants a short video teaching them how to generate a pass-
word using a random-letter hash. After the video, we dis-
played the letter map and the special string used in the video
and asked them to generate two passwords. At this point, the
participant did not need to memorize a letter map or a spe-
cial string, but had to practice generating passwords using
such a map. Next, we provided participants with an inter-
face to choose a random letter-to-consonant map for the first
20 letters of the alphabet.
In the next step, we showed them a simple illustrative
video explaining our memorization with help of words tech-
nique. Then we ask the participants to repeat the letter pairs
and the corresponding words for themselves. Although such
a memorization might be done more quickly by speaking
aloud, we asked the participants to type the letter pairs and
words to ensure compliance. To further solidify memoriza-
tion of the character map, we gave three further exercises:
• Showing the letter pairs and asking the participants to type
the words.
• Showing only the left letter and asking the participant to
first type the word and then the right letter.
• The same as second exercise, but showing the left letters
in a different order, e.g., “b, d, c, e, a” in Table 2.
Practice. Immediately after the learning phase, partici-
pants were presented with 15 artificial website names to try
to log in, one at a time. For each website, they were asked to
type the password using the mindhash that they had learned.
Two hint buttons were provided. One showed text instruc-
tions on how to generate the password using the mindhash,
and the other one displayed the participant’s secret key.
Participants had three tries to type each password. If they
failed in all tries, they were presented with the correct re-
sponse.
Feedback after learning. Participants were asked to give
us their feedback on different aspects of the study. We asked
them if the task was fun/boring, easy/hard and if the pass-
word generation became easier toward the end, on a seven
point bipolar rating scale. Finally, we asked the participants
whether they would like to participate in our follow-ups.
Follow-up evaluations. After learning and practice (day
0), we performed six follow-up evaluations of the partici-
pants’ ability to log in using their passwords, over a period
of one month. The first follow-up was performed the next
day (day 1), the second follow-up was again a day later (day
2), and the remaining four follow-ups were at day 4, day 8,
day 16 and the final follow-up during days 32-35. The last
follow-up was scheduled during a holiday period and thus
we allowed the participants to fill it out anytime during a 3
day interval. At each follow-up, the participants were asked
to generate passwords for 4 challenges. For each challenge,
three attempts was given to type the password, and then the
correct password was shown.
Studies show that users manage on average 25 password-
protected accounts (Florencio and Herley 2007). Some of
these accounts are used frequently (e.g., work account) and
some are used occasionally. We consider 25 synthetic web-
site names chosen as random common words: {kite, pillow,
atlantic, bundle, reverse , family, quebec, cough, subject,
mug, spike, fishing, jumper, knob, chord, quiz, fixed, world,
campaign, warm, navy, banquet, hazy, chef, twist}. We as-
sume that the first 15 names are frequent accounts and the
last 10 are occasional or newly opened accounts. To reflect
this, we asked the participant to type the passwords for all
the frequent accounts at the end of the learning phase. The
challenges in the follow-up evaluations were chosen with
probability 75% from the frequent accounts and with prob-
ability 25% from the infrequent accounts, to reflect the use
of passwords for both logging in to frequent accounts and
infrequent or one-time accounts.
The 1/2/4/8/16/32-day timing follows a doubling sched-
ule (Pimsleur 1967), which has been shown to be an ef-
fective repetition spacing in the practice of learning (Woz-
niak and Gorzelanczyk 1994). In addition to these sequen-
tial follow-ups, we ran a quantitative follow-up survey on
day 4 of the study. In this survey, participants were asked to
provide a self-recall of the secret key that they memorized.
Hints and writing down passwords. Since the study was
performed online, one concern is that our results would
be tainted by participants writing down their secret keys
(or storing them in a file) and consulting this record, i.e.,
cheat sheet, without our knowledge in the experiment. More-
over, self-reporting cannot always be trusted in an envi-
ronment like Mechanical Turk when users have motiva-
tions that keep them from being honest (Peer et al. 2017;
Suri, Goldstein, and Mason 2011). In our case, workers
do not know our experimental protocol and may hope for
bonuses for “good” work, not to mention pervasive fears of
unfair rejections. Moreover, workers who want to be on the
good side of the requester for future work may try to im-
press the requester with their good memory. For all these
reasons, it would be tempting for a worker to record his se-
cret key without admitting it to a requester, even if the re-
quester claimed that there would be no consequence for re-
porting this. To address this, participants knew that through-
out the study they had constant access to two hint buttons,
one reminding them of the instructions and the other one
reminding them of their secret key. Participants were told
that there was no penalty or cost to use these hints, and they
pressed the hint buttons liberally.
Although we understand that pressing a hint button on the
screen is ecologically different than using a cheat sheet, we
were hoping that capturing participants’ usage of these hint
buttons could give us some insight about the extent of users
long-term dependence to the cheat sheets in real-life. The
use of a written record may not constitute a serious security
problem (Cheswick 2013), and this argument is of course
only stronger if the written record is only consulted during
the first few days of learning the secret keys.
4 Results
In this section, we present the result of our user study. The
participants were US-based crowd workers on Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk platform with at least a 98% task approval
rating. Our participants reported being between 21 and 55
years old with average age of 31 years old. The gender dis-
tribution was 40% female and 60% male. For random-letter
hash, overall 32 users participated in the training phase and
12 finished the last follow-up. For the 3-word hash, overall
34 users participated in the training and 14 finished the last
follow-up 1. Look at Table 3 for more details.
mindhash/survey day 0 1 2 4 8 16 32-35
Random-letter 32 27 27 24 14 14 12
3-word 34 28 25 25 18 16 14
Table 3: Number of participants in the original study (day
0) and follow-up surveys during the one-month study.
Time Random-letter 3-word
Learning+Memorization 8+13 min 11+0 min
Password Generation 19 sec 25 sec
Table 4: For random-letter (3-word) mindhash, learning
time includes watching a 2 (4) minute tutorial video, choos-
ing a personal secret key, and practicing the mindhash on
a few passwords. Memorization time includes watching a
3.5 (0) minute video describing the memorization technique,
and using it to memorize the secret key. Password Genera-
tion time is calculated for typing a password of length 8.
Learning phase. Learning times are reported in Table 4.
The median times were 8 minutes to learn the random-letter
hash and 11 minutes to learn the 3-word hash. The learn-
ing time for the 3-word hash was longer due to the longer
training video (4-minute video versus 2-minute video). The
memorization step for the 3-word hash was negligible. For
the random-letter hash, the memorization time was 13 min-
utes, including a 3.5-minute video tutorial (see Section 3 for
the details of memorization).
The median time that the participants spent on generat-
ing each character of the password decreases over time (Fig-
ure 2 left) with a mean of 2.3 seconds per character for the
random-letter hash, and 3 seconds per character for the 3-
word hash (computed over the last 5 logins). This corre-
sponds to a password generation time of 19 seconds for the
random-letter hash and of 25 seconds for the 3-word hash
for a password of length 8 (Table 4) .
For both groups, the accuracy of typing the correct pass-
word during the practice phase was high: for each login, at
least 96% (82%) of the participants typed correct passwords
within three attempts using the random-letter (3-word) hash.
Furthermore, the mean number of tries decreased over time
(Figure 2 right).
In Figure 2 we see that, for both 3-word and random-letter
mindhashes, the speed of generating each character of the
password (left figure) and the accuracy of typing the pass-
word (right figure) increases as the number of logins in-
creases. This improvement is an indicator that these mind-
hashes are self-rehearsing.
1Participants were paid $2 to complete the qualification, $10
($7) to complete the day 0 training for random-letter (3-word)
mindhash, $2 for sequential follow-ups, and $4 for day 4 quan-
titative follow-up.
Figure 2: Practice phase, 15 logins. Left: Median time that the participants spent per character of the password. Right: Mean
number of tries to type the correct password.
Figure 3: Left: Median time that participants spent generating each character of the password. Right: Mean number of tries for
participants to login successfully. Error bars represent one standard error.
Follow-ups. Figure 3 left shows the median of the time
that the participants spent on generating each character of
the password each day. The error bars indicate the stan-
dard deviation of the medians, across participants, for all lo-
gins during the day. From prior work on memorization and
self-rehearsing passwords, we hypothesized that the pass-
words generation time would decrease over time as the se-
cret key and password process is establishing in long-term
memory. Indeed, for both mindhashes, although the gaps be-
tween follow-ups doubled each time, password generation
time remained low (less than 3.5 second/character during
the last follow-up). This is an evidence that users could still
type passwords reasonably quickly even for websites that
are visited rarely. Figure 3 right shows the mean number of
tries that participants needed to successfully login. Our re-
sult shows that, although the gaps between logins doubled
over time, the accuracy of typing the correct password for
both mindhashes remained high over time (less than 1.3 at-
tempts to successfully login). This is consistent with the self-
rehearsable property of the password schemes.
As the participants type their passwords over time
(follow-ups), we expect the secret key to be self-rehearsed
and therefore participants to click on the secret key hint but-
ton less frequently. Figure 4 shows the fraction of partici-
pants that used the secret key reminder hint button. Table 5
shows these results for the last follow-up. For 3-word hash
42% of the participants successfully typed passwords with-
out the help of the hint buttons. For random-letter hash, the
Figure 4: Fraction of participants that did not click on the
hint button during logins and the fraction of participants that
used the hint button for maximum one login.
number is smaller, 25%, but still comprises a meaningful
fraction of users. Note that participants were told that there
was no penalty for using the hints, hence the actual use of
such aids in practice would be expected to be lower. At the
4th day quantitative follow-up, participants were asked to
type a free recall of their secret key. For the 3-word hash,
70% of the participants perfectly remembered the 3 words
and 95% of the participants remembered at least 2 words.
For random-letter hash 31% of the participants remembered
at least 18 letters out of 20 (90% of what they memorized),
and 78% of the participants remembered at least 12 out of
No. click(s) Random-letter hash 3-word hash
0 clicks 25% 42%
≤ 1 click 33% 78%
Table 5: Fraction of participants that clicked on the hint
button for the secret key during the last follow-up.
20 letters (60% of what they memorized).
At the end of the follow-ups after a month, participants
were asked if they had adopted the mindhash for generat-
ing passwords for managing their own personal passwords.
For random-letter hash, 25% of the participants reported that
they have adopted the mindhash in “real life”. For the 3-
word hash, 42% of the participants reported that they used
the mindhash for generating their own personal passwords.
Although such statistics are known to be greatly inflated, the
comparison between the two schemes may be of interest.
Feedback. At the end of the training phase, we asked the
participants to fill out the feedback form discussed in Sec-
tion 3, and we further received free-text feedback through-
out the one month study. For both mindhashes, participants
reported that the effort for generating password decreased
over time. Participants of both studies reported that they
have found the task of generating passwords using mind-
hashes neither easy nor hard, with random- letter hash being
slightly easier. Participants of random-letter hash found the
task slightly fun. This was not completely the case for the
3-word hash as the participants reported that the task was
neither boring nor fun. For both studies, 6% of the partici-
pants reported that they wrote down information.
Overall, participants found the random-letter hash study
more fun and interesting. One reason was that they were
surprised that they could memorize such a letter map: “This
actually worked” or “Worked surprisingly well” were some
of the comments that they provided. Over the one month pe-
riod, participants got comfortable generating passwords and
reported that the password generation is feeling more and
more natural over time. Some typical anecdotal feedback
that participants provided during the follow-up included:
3-word hash: “It’s getting easier.” or “It’s definitely getting
easier. I still have to open my word list but my brain is adapt-
ing and I’m starting to know what each letter should translate
to without looking sometimes.”.
Random-letter hash: “I have definitely warmed up to the
program. It feels more natural now than the last time. ” or “I
think I’ve finally got a handle on this password combination!
Well, minus the one mistake.”.
5 Theoretical analysis
Usability of a mindhash has two main aspects: learning time
and password generation time. In this section, we discuss the
rigorous model from Blum and Vempala for the password
generation time.
Password generation time is the time that the user spends
on outputting her passwords. Password generation is done
entirely in the human’s head with no paper, writing instru-
ment, or computing device. It can be viewed as a restricted
streaming computation. The working memory (Jonides,
Lacey, and Nee 2005) is very small, typically at most one or
two pointers and two characters (which might typically be
letters or digits). Each elementary operation (retrieve a se-
quence from long-term memory, follow a pointer, add two
digits mod 10) has a cost, which is the total number of
write operations to the working memory. For example, re-
trieving a pointer to a sequence in long-term memory has
cost 1, following the sequence has cost 1, adding two digits
(mod 10) has cost 1 or 2 depending on the number of digits
created. A human algorithm can thus be assigned a total cost,
by adding up the cost of each step. This is the human com-
plexity of the algorithm (called Human Usability Measure
or HUM in Blum and Vempala). It is meant as a complexity
measure for human computation analogous to the standard
runtime complexity analysis of Turing machines. The HUM
measures the human effort required to execute algorithms.
Just as machines running the same algorithm can take dif-
ferent times, humans also have variability in speed.
Password Generation Phase. Given a challenge c =
c1 . . . cn, start with the first letter c1. Output the mapping of
c1. If mapping of c1 is not defined, don’t output anything or
output the wild card (depending on the mindhash’s instruc-
tion). Shift the pointer to the next letter and do similarly for
the remaining letters. Append the special string s to the end
of your password. To illustrate this measure, we now com-
pute the HUM for the 3-word and the random-letter hash.
HUM of 3-word hash. Let W1W2W3 be the sequence of
words and s the special string. Let f be the letter-to-letter
map defined by the 3-word hash. The cost of applying f is
initially higher (to scan the words and find the next conso-
nant) but finally becomes 1.
Algorithm 1 3-word hash
Input: Challenge c = c1 . . . cn
Retrieve challenge c. Pointer→ c1. Cost = 1
While not end of c :
Let c∗ be the current character.
• Output f(c∗) Cost = 1
• Shift pointer to next character. Cost = 1
Retrieve fixed string s. Pointer→ s1. Cost = 1
While not end of s :
• Output current character. Cost = 1
• Shift pointer to next character. Cost = 1
The HUM is 1 + n(1 + 1) + 2|s| = 2n+ 2|s|+ 1.
HUM of random-letter hash. Similar to Algorithm 1, we
can write the algorithm that describes the HUM of the ran-
dom letter hash. The HUM is 2n+ 2|s|+ 1.
Security. Password strategies should be secure against a
computationally all-powerful adversary observing (chal-
lenge, response) pairs and trying to impersonate the human.
We use the following two security parameters, identified in
earlier work (Blum and Vempala 2015).
It should be hard for the adversary to guess any password
of the user. This is the intuition behind the definition of the
security parameter K. Given a password strategy S and a
positive integer i, we say that KS = i if for any single chal-
lenge c, the probability that an adversary can guess the cor-
rect response to c is at most 1/10i.
Assume that an internet hacker has found your password
to a couple of insecure websites, and is trying to login to
your bank account. She might not have the full information
to precisely guess your bank account password, but she will
have partial information that narrows her predictions to 4
choices. As a result, if your bank website allows her to try
multiple guesses, she can successfully login to your account.
How many tries will she need? How many passwords will
she need to see in the clear? This is the motivation behind
the definition of the security parameter Q. Given a password
strategy S and P ∈ (0, 1), QS(P ) is defined as the number
of random (challenge, response) pairs that an adversary must
observe in order to be able to respond correctly to the next
challenge with probability greater than P . The dictionary of
challenges must be specified (e.g., English words, random
strings, the top 500 most popular website names, etc.).
Krandom-letter. Given a challenge c = c1 . . . cn, the adver-
sary can respond correctly to c only if she can correctly
guess the mappings for all the letters of c and the special
string s. Each random letter has been chosen uniformly at
random from the set of 21 consonants. The user’s special
string consists of one capital letter, one number and one spe-
cial character, all chosen uniformly at random too2. There-
fore, the probability that the adversary can guess the correct
password is
Pr[guess(c) = password(c)] ≤ (1/21)n(1/26)(1/10)2.
Assuming that an average password has length 8 (challenge
of length five characters3), this gives us Krandom-letter ≥ 10.
Qrandom-letter(P ). The adversary can respond correctly to
a challenge only if she has seen all letters in the challenge
in the previous challenges. If she has not seen even one let-
ter, the chance of guessing the correct response to the chal-
lenge is 1/21. What are the expected number of (challenge,
response) pairs that the adversary should see to have com-
plete knowledge of the mapping of all letters of a random
new challenge? For the top 500 domain names, this value is
equal to 6.6 (Blum and Vempala 2015). Therefore, for any
P ≥ 1/21, Qrandom-letter(P ) ≥ 6.6.
Most secure websites block the user’s account if he types
a wrong password for 3-5 times. This is equivalent to 20% <
P < 33%, and thus the above security parameter value is
meaningful. Also note that once the adversary sees one pass-
word, she already knows the special string s. Therefore s
does not contribute to Q. The security of the 3-word hash is
2This assumption is based on the distribution of special strings
reported by the users.
3For longer challenges, the user can use only the first 5 charac-
ters of the challenge.
lower since the total entropy generated by choosing 3 ran-
dom words is smaller. Q3-word is estimated as between 3 and
4 (Blum and Vempala 2015).
6 Limitations
We have shown that mindhashes are secure and human-
usable solutions for choosing passwords for many users.
However, in this section, we discuss limitations of mind-
hashes and the study that we have done in this paper.
Password policies. Websites have policies with different
password requirements involving password length or spe-
cial characters. In our study, users were instructed to append
a fixed “special string” to all of their passwords in order to
meet such requirements. A recent survey finds that it is often
possible to choose a single such string that simultaneously
satisfies the requirements of different websites (Seitz et al.
2017). However, in special cases, a website may have differ-
ent requirements that may not be met by the special string. In
general, this is considered as a challenging problem for other
password generating approaches as well (Furnell 2007).
Short or irregular challenges. Some website names may
be very short or contain non-alphabetic characters, such as
53.com for the Fifth Third Bank. While not measured in our
study, it would be natural for users to choose a memorable,
sufficiently long challenge for these websites, such as the
string fifththird. Note that different users may choose differ-
ent challenges, but this does not cause any problems as long
as each user is consistent with using the same challenge. Fur-
ther study is necessary to see how common this problem is
and how easy it is for users to recall their challenges.
Infrequently used accounts. Our study does evaluate the
ability to correctly generate passwords for numerous new
challenges, which is similar to generating a password for a
rarely visited website. The 3-word hash has a natural self-
rehearsing property so that using it frequently reinforces the
memory of the entire secret key, and hence generating pass-
words for rarely used challenges is straightforward. How-
ever, for the random-letter hash, infrequently used letters
pose a greater problem. For example, a user may forget her
mapping for the letter q if it is never used.
Passwords sharing. Sharing passwords across different ac-
counts is a problem that is not addressed by the mindhashes.
Although mindhashes do not offer any solution for shar-
ing passwords across different accounts, if a user chooses
to share a password, security is not entirely compromised.
Changing passwords. Certain systems may require pass-
words to be changed periodically. This is a problem with the
password management that is not studied in our work and
is not directly addressed by mindhashes. A solution for this,
suggested in Blum and Vempala, is to append a digit that in-
dicates which letter of a challenge the user should start with
when generating a password. The human usability of these
approaches can be studied as part of future work.
Entropy of passwords. Mindhashes assume that the secret
key is chosen randomly. For example, in the random-letter
strategy, we assume that the user memorizes a random letter-
to-letter map. Although we provide a simple interface for
users to build such a random map, it is still possible that
in practice users may choose predictable secret keys (e.g.,
for the letter a some letters may be more commonly chosen,
such as p for apple, or a person named Alice may be more
likely to choose l). This would reduce the entropy and ad-
vantage an adversary that attempts to guess the secret key.
Multiple accounts on the same website. Some users may
have multiple accounts on one website. In this case, they
may use the same password across accounts.
Dropouts and hints. For both mindhashes, approximately
60% of participants dropped out during the course of the
study. Our statistics should be interpreted as representative
of the 40% of participants who completed the study. While
we could have provided additional incentives in the form of
completion/milestone bonuses to increase completion rates,
we felt that there was value in observing the natural comple-
tion rate at a static pay rate. As discussed, participants had
the opportunity to press a hint button to see their secret keys
without any discouragement or adverse affect on their pay-
ment. In the last follow-up, 25% (42%) of the participants
using the random-letter (3-word) mindhash did not use hints
even once. Taken together, if one considers mindhashes “us-
able” for such participants, this gives a lower bound of 9%
(18%) on the usability rate. This is a lower bound because
it is likely that some users did not complete the study for
various personal reasons aside from usability, and that some
users clicked the hint buttons even when they would have
found the system usable without hints. We provided the hint
button to dissuade users from secretly recording their secret
keys in a way that we could not monitor.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents the first user study of two different mind-
hashes (i.e., password strategies): 3-word hash and random
letter hash. Participants in our user study spent a median of
11 minutes learning the 3-word hash and 8+13=21 minutes
learning the random-letter hash. After the learning phase,
the user is ready to use these mindhashes, and it takes 19-25
seconds to generate a password. As predicted by the self-
rehearsing property of mindhashes, the time to generate a
password decreases over time. We showed that, although
there are increasing gaps between rehearsals with no prac-
tice, users remembered their secret key and were able to
successfully login to arbitrary websites. Although the pres-
ence of the reminder button decreases ecological validity,
users consulted the button with decreasing frequency. It was
encouraging that some users seemed interested in adopting
these methods to manage their own passwords. A natural re-
search question is to identify mindhashes with even better
usability and security.
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